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Weak and Global Supervenience Are Strong

Abstract
Kim argues that weak and global supervenience are too weak to guarantee any sort of
dependency. Of the three original forms of supervenience, strong, weak, and global, each
commonly wielded across all branches of philosophy, two are thus cast aside as uninteresting or
useless.

His arguments, however, fail to appreciate the strength of weak and global

supervenience. I investigate what weak and global supervenience relations are functionally and
how they relate to strong supervenience. For a large class of properties, weak and global
supervenience are equivalent to strong supervenience. I then offer a series of arguments showing
that it is precisely because of their strength, not their weakness, that both weak and global
supervenience are useless in characterizing any dependencies of interest to philosophers.

Weak and Global Supervenience Are Useless
To say that A properties supervene on B properties is merely to say that A properties are
a function of B properties, or, more perspicuously, that which A properties a thing has is a
function of which B properties it has. It is not to say that A properties depend on B properties,
for A properties can be a function of B properties also in virtue of A being identical to B, in
virtue of B depending on A, or in virtue of A and B both depending on C.1 Nonetheless, even
though supervenience is merely a functional relation and not a newly discovered type of
dependency, as many once thought, a dependency relation of some kind, or, in the limiting case,
an identity relation, will underlie any supervenience relation.2 A supervenience relation holds
because of the underlying dependency.
Kim, however, argues that weak and global supervenience are too weak to guarantee any
sort of dependency. Of the three original forms of supervenience, strong, weak, and global, each
commonly wielded across all branches of philosophy, two are thus cast aside as uninteresting or
useless.

His arguments, however, fail to appreciate the strength of weak and global

supervenience. In sections I and II I investigate what weak and global supervenience relations
are functionally and how they relate to strong supervenience. For a large class of properties,
weak and global supervenience are equivalent to strong supervenience. In section III, I offer a
series of arguments showing that it is precisely because of their strength, not their weakness, that
both weak and global supervenience are useless in characterizing any dependencies of interest to
philosophers.

1

B depending on A: A = {being male}, B = {being a bachelor, being a husband}. A and B both depending on C: A
= {being a husband}, B = {being a bachelor, being a bachelorette, being a wife}, C = {being male}.
2

I will consider identity to be a degenerate or limiting case of dependency just as identity is considered a degenerate
case of (improper) parthood. Thus, I will henceforth drop the ‘or identity’ qualification.

I: Characterizing Weak Supervenience
Weak and strong supervenience are standardly defined as follows, where an individual x
and an individual y are A-twins iff they have the same A properties:3
Weak Supervenience: A properties weakly supervene on B properties =df for any
possible world w, B-twins in w are A-twins in w.
Strong Supervenience: A properties strongly supervene on B properties =df for any
possible worlds w and w* and any individuals x and y, if x in w is a B-twin of y in w*,
then x in w is an A-twin of y in w*.
Strong supervenience says that A properties are a function of B properties, leaving our
quantifiers ‘wide open.’ That is, there is a single function f that for any possible individual at
any possible world w maps which B properties it has at w to which A properties it has at w. In
contrast, weak supervenience says that for each world w there is a function fw that maps any
individual’s B properties at w to its A properties at w.

Strong and Weak Supervenience are Equivalent for Intrinsic Properties
Kim points out what he calls an ‘obvious’ fact about the two relations:

“Strong

supervenience entails weak supervenience; weak supervenience does not entail strong
supervenience.”4 But is the latter so obvious? True, there is no entailment in virtue of logical
form, but this hardly settles the matter. One line of reasoning to the contrary goes as follows:
Assume that strong supervenience does not obtain, i.e., that for two sets of properties, A
and B, the A properties of some possible thing are not a function of its B properties. Thus, there
are two possible individuals, c and d, that have the same B properties but different A properties.
But, given the lack of limits on the way worlds can be, it seems there could be a single world

3See, e.g., Kim,

“Supervenience as a Philosophical Concept,” p. 141; McLaughlin, “Varieties of Supervenience,” p.

24.
4Kim,

“Concepts of Supervenience,” pp. 66-7.
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containing something with the same A and B properties as c and something else with the same A
and B properties as d. And this would mean that weak supervenience also does not obtain. 5
In fact, given a quite plausible metaphysically necessary recombination principle, such as
those used by Lewis, Armstrong, and others, we can give some substance to this line of thought,
suggesting that, for intrinsic properties anyway, weak and strong supervenience are equivalent.6
I will use the following principle, where an individual x at a world w1 and an individual y at a
world w2 are duplicates iff x has exactly those intrinsic properties at w1 which y has at w2:
Recombination Principle: For any individual x in world w1, and for any individual y in
world w2, there is a world w* containing individuals x’ and y’ such that x’ in w* is a
duplicate of x in w1 and y’ in w* is a duplicate of y in w2.7
One might think — and in fact this seems to be Kim’s thinking8 — that there could be a
property G that weakly supervenes on a property F without also strongly supervening on it since
there could be both a world w1 containing only the individual b with property F and property G
and a world w2 containing only the individual c with property F but without property G. At each
5Blackburn

gives a similar argument in “Supervenience Revisited,” p. 50. He says it would be mysterious, or
require an explanation, why weak supervenience would obtain but not strong. He does not distinguish between
intrinsic and extrinsic properties, however, and doing this allows us to see how with intrinsic properties weak
without strong is impossible, whereas with extrinsic properties it is, at least in some trivial cases, no mystery at all.
6Lewis

tells us that “Roughly speaking, the principle is that anything can coexist with anything else, at least
provided they occupy distinct spatio-temporal positions.” (On the Plurality of Worlds, p. 88) According to
Armstrong, “Any two distinct existences may be found together, or found one without the other, in a single world.”
(A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility, p. 20)
7

Some will deny this principle, e.g. those who think that the intrinsic properties of an individual have implications
for how other individuals are. Perhaps charge is like this, for if a particle has a certain charge, one might reason,
this necessitates that there is a certain type of electrical field external to it. Thus, perhaps there are two individuals
whose intrinsic properties cannot be instantiated at the same world. On the usual way of spelling out the notion of
an intrinsic property, however, this line of reasoning is problematic. Lewis explicates the notion by saying, "A thing
has its intrinsic properties in virtue of the way that thing itself, and nothing else, is." ("Extrinsic Properties," p. 197)
Yablo says an intrinsic property is "a property that a thing has (or lacks) regardless of what may be going on outside
of itself.” ("Intrinsicness," 479) A natural way to take these claims is as saying that intrinsic property instantiations
are modally independent of the instantiation of intrinsic properties by entirely distinct individuals. It therefore
seems that those denying the Recombination Principle have a different notion of 'intrinsic'. For ease of exposition,
let us define 'intrinsic' to require this modal independence. Thus, through our definition, the Recombination
Principle is guaranteed. Of course, this merely shifts the argument. The question then is no longer whether the
Recombination Principle is true but rather whether the properties which concern us are intrinsic in the required
sense.
8

“Concepts of Supervenience,” pp. 64-65.
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world there is a function fw such that whether an individual instantiates G is a function fw of
whether it instantiates F, yet there is no function f holding across both worlds such that whether
an individual instantiates G is a function f of whether it instantiates F. However, this sort of
reasoning relies on a partial description of logical space, omitting the distribution of properties in
possible worlds other than w1 and w2.9 In fact, the Recombination Principle shows that if there
are worlds w1 and w2, then there also must be a world w* containing individuals b’ and c’ that
are duplicates of b in w1 and c in w2, respectively. And w* shows us that, if F and G are intrinsic
properties, G does not, after all, weakly supervene on F.
w1: Fb Gb

w2: Fc ¬Gc

w*: Fb’ Gb’

Fc’ ¬Gc’

In short, for all intrinsic properties weak and strong supervenience are equivalent.10
Both weak and strong supervenience are generalizations over possible worlds. Thus
there are as many sorts of weak and strong supervenience as there are sorts of possibility:
metaphysical, nomological, historical, epistemic, etc. Since the Recombination Principle is a
thesis about what is metaphysically possible, only the equivalence of metaphysical weak and
strong supervenience relations, for intrinsic properties, has been shown.

9

One might insist that Kim’s reasoning does establish that weak supervenience does not entail strong: “All that is
necessary to show that one claim does not entail another is to find a possible world in some model at which the one
holds and the other doesn’t, where a model is any set of possible worlds, no matter how impoverished. Thus, the
model containing two worlds shows the lack of entailment.” There is no agreed upon definition of the technical
term ‘entailment’, so it is perhaps best to cash out my claim in neutral terms. Rather than saying that weak
supervenience entails strong for intrinsic properties, let me say that in any model satisfying the Recombination
Principle, if weak supervenience holds between two sets of intrinsic properties in a world, then strong supervenience
also holds there. However, it is not clear that Kim has provided a countermodel since it is not clear we’re
considering a legitimate model in the first place. We take for granted that there are some sorts of constraints on
what counts as a legitimate model. A model cannot countenance an object that is both six feet tall and four feet tall,
for example. Similarly, one might think, the Recombination Principle is specifying what is to count as a legitimate
model. Further, even if the entailment of strong supervenience by weak is in doubt, this does not call into question
our real concern here, viz., that for intrinsic properties, the obtaining of weak supervenience necessitates the
obtaining of strong.
10Compare

the similar style of reasoning (toward a different conclusion) employed by Paull and Sider in their “In
Defense of Global Supervenience,” pp. 835-841.

4

Strong and Weak Supervenience are Equivalent for Local Properties
Kim’s reasoning that weak and strong supervenience are not equivalent falls short.
Nonetheless Kim’s conclusion is correct. The property of being alone (being the only individual
at a world) is such that either all or none of the members of a world will have it.11 Therefore, the
property of being alone will weakly supervene on the property of having negative charge (or, for
that matter, on any property): throughout any world, everything that is alike with respect to
charge will be alike with respect to being alone since throughout any world everything is alike
with respect to being alone. But, clearly, being alone doesn’t strongly supervene on having
negative charge. Thus weak and strong supervenience are not in general equivalent.12
But are they equivalent for most properties, or for those properties that most concern us?
If so, then the difference between the two supervenience relations would be inconsequential; a
single relation would suffice for our needs.
For some extrinsic properties the argument for equivalence extends quite naturally. For
properties such as “being within a meter of a negative charge” or “having a brother,” e.g., the
Recombination Principle also applies and, hence, weak and strong supervenience are equivalent
for any of these properties as well.

Rather than recombining the individual in question,

recombining the mereological sum of the individual together with everything within a meter of it
will guarantee that if there’s a world in which x is (isn’t) within a meter of a negative charge and
another world in which y is (isn’t) within a meter of a negative charge, then there will be a world
in which duplicates of x and y exist and also are (aren’t) within a meter of a negative charge.
Similarly, rather than recombining only an individual, we can recombine a chunk of space-time
that includes the individual from the time in question back through her conception, that includes
the lives of her parents from their birth forward to the time in question, and includes the lives of

11Cf.

Lewis’s “Extrinsic Properties.”

12Note

that I am now making a point concerning abundant properties, such that for any collection of possible
individuals there will be some corresponding property. It is fairly plausible that all sparse properties are intrinsic,
and, thus, using such a notion of ‘property,’ weak and strong supervenience would be generally equivalent.
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any sons of her parents from conception to the time in question. Recombining such chunks
guarantees that two individuals can be duplicated to generate a world containing their twins with
respect to having a brother.13
For many extrinsic properties, however, there is no simple way to extend the application
of the Recombination Principle. Consider the property of “being the tallest in the world.” If
Bob, in world w, is the tallest in his world at 7’-11”, and Sue, in w’, is the tallest in her world at
8’-5”, there is no way to use recombination to generate a world w* containing duplicates of Bob
and Sue in which they are both the tallest in the world. There is no local state of affairs that can
be included with them to let us use recombination. Even duplicating Bob’s entire world with
him won’t guarantee we’ll get a world in which Bob’s duplicate is the tallest since being the
tallest rides on what else might be added during recombination, such as Sue’s duplicate. What
makes Bob the tallest isn’t just the height of Bob, the height of his friend, the height of his
neighbor, and so forth for the rest of the eight people who inhabit his world; it is also the fact that
these eight people are the entirety of the world’s population. If we wanted to use recombination,
we would somehow have to recombine this fact or property as well — what Armstrong calls a
fact of totality14 — but, of course, we can’t since this fact is not independent of other facts, and
this independence is just what is required for the Recombination Principle.
Call a property p a ‘local property’ iff for any possible individual i, whether or not i has p
is fixed by i’s intrinsic properties or by the intrinsic properties instantiated throughout a chunk of
space-time containing i. The opposite of a local property we’ll call a ‘totality property’. A
totality property holds in virtue of how the totality is, i.e., not merely in virtue of how the chunk
13 One

might question the reasoning in this paragraph because one might argue that space-time can have ‘edges’. If
space-time ends one-half light year from me, then recombining all of reality that’s within a light year of me won’t
guarantee that my resulting duplicate will, like me, have the property of not being within a light year of a unicorn
since the process of recombination may add a unicorn one-half light year from my duplicate. I think it is not clear
whether space-time can have edges of this sort or, if it can, whether we can talk meaningfully about distances
beyond the edge of space-time and therefore whether we can use recombination to preserve such properties as being
one light year from a spot not in space-time. In any case, the point of the discussion is to discriminate those
properties that are preserved through recombination and those that aren’t — whether a particular property, such as
being within a meter of an electron, falls on one side or the other is of secondary concern.
14A

Combinatorial Theory of Possibility, pp. 92f.
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of reality which constitutes the entire world is, but also in virtue of the fact that that chunk of
reality is the entire world.15 Properties in general are a combination of a local property and a
totality property, either component possibly null.16 Bob’s being the tallest person in the world
consists in Bob being 7’-11” and Bob belonging to a world containing nobody taller than 7’-11”.
Sue’s not being famous comprises nothing intrinsic to her but belonging to a world containing
few people that know of her.
Any intrinsic property p is trivially a local property since whether or not an individual
instantiates p is a function of whether that individual instantiates a certain intrinsic property (viz.,
p itself). Being within a meter of a negative charge and being a brother of someone are also local
properties since the intrinsic properties instantiated throughout the previously discussed chunks
of space-time surrounding any individual i necessarily fixes whether or not i is within a meter of
a negative charge or whether or not i is a brother. The property of belonging to a world
containing a unicorn, in contrast, is a totality property since it depends upon what else exists in
the world. Such a property is not a local property since for those individuals belonging to worlds
without unicorns there is no chunk of space-time containing them the intrinsic properties of
which determine whether they have that property — it also depends upon whether unicorns lie
outside that chunk.

Because local properties are exactly those that can be recombined,

recombination will guarantee the equivalence of weak and strong supervenience iff the properties
are local properties.

Claims of Weak Supervenience Are Partial Characterizations
The property of being the tallest in the world weakly, but not strongly, supervenes on the
height of an individual. At each world there is a function fw that maps an individual’s height to
15 The

Recombination Principle allows the recombining of properties across a mathematical space, the dimensions
of which are spatial and temporal. Why these dimensions? Because the spatial and temporal relations are all and
only the extrinsic relations. Thus, all combinations within this space can be combinations of properties, since any
relations beyond those captured by the dimensions of the space will be intrinsic relations that can be captured using
only the properties of the relata. This suggests that a relational property of an individual will be a local property if
the relation is extrinsic (or, in other words, spatio-temporal) and be a totality property if the relation is intrinsic.
16 This

is not to suggest that there is a unique decomposition into a local and a totality property.

7

the fact of whether or not she is the world’s tallest (i.e., to the extrinsic property of being the
tallest or the extrinsic property of not being the tallest). Of course, in this case it’s easy to see
that this function is determined by the height of the tallest individual in the world and, moreover,
that there is a single function f applicable across all worlds such that x’s being the tallest person
in a world is a function f of x’s height together with the height of the tallest person at x’s world.
So while the property of being the tallest in the world weakly supervenes on one’s height, it
strongly supervenes on one’s height and the height of the tallest person in the world (or, more
properly, on the properties of having height x, y, z, ... together with the properties of belonging to
a world in which the tallest person has height x, y, z, ...).
We have seen that there are some pairs of properties that are related by weak, but not
strong, supervenience. But from the examples we’ve seen so far it looks like this relation only
partially characterizes a dependency that is more fully and informatively characterized in terms
of strong supervenience. In fact, this holds in general.
One set of properties, Α, weakly supervenes on another set, Β, just in case at every world
the subset α of properties of Α that an individual has is a function of the subset β of properties of
Β it has — that is, iff for each world w there is a function fw, such that for every individual i of
that world, αi = fw(βi). But what could possibly guarantee this across all worlds? With the
plenitude of possible worlds, why isn’t there a single world with two individuals that have the
same subset of properties of Β but different subsets of properties of Α?
One possible answer is that Α strongly supervenes on Β. That is, if it is impossible to
have two individuals at a single world, one with subset β of B and subset α1 of A, and another
with subset β of B and subset α2 (≠α1) of A, this could be part of a more general impossibility
of there even being an individual with subsets β and α2. Perhaps an individual’s having of α1 is
necessitated by its having of β; the conflict between the having of α2 and the having of β would,
in this case, be determined solely by what α2 and β are. That is, the nature of the properties
could preclude one of these two combinations. For example, you can’t have one person who
utters “I promise that . . .” and thereby makes a promise and another person with the same

8

intentions uttering the same statement who doesn’t make a promise since uttering “I promise that
. . .” with certain intentions just is to make a promise.
If, though, Α doesn’t strongly supervene on Β, i.e. if there is nothing impossible about an
individual having β and α2, and similarly nothing impossible about an individual having β and
α1, then why can’t a world contain one of each sort of individual? Something must guarantee
that all the individuals at one world having subset β will have subset α1 while all the individuals
at another world having subset β will have subset α2. Whatever it is must be something that
varies from world to world though across any particular world it remains constant. Using the
Recombination Principle, we can generate a world that has as one part a duplicate of a world at
which individuals have subsets β and α1 and, as another part, a duplicate of a world at which
individuals have subsets β and α2. Yet the resulting world is guaranteed not to have both an
individual with subsets β and α1 and another with β and α2. Since local properties would be
recombined with such a process, β and/or α1 must include a non-local property; that is, at least
one of them must include a property holding (at least partially) in virtue of some totality fact
about the world. This, though, is just another way of saying that the Α properties an individual
has are a function of which Β properties it has and which of certain totality properties T it has.
That is, this is to say that Α strongly supervenes on Β ∪ T. Thus, a description of a mere weak
supervenience relation gives a mere partial characterization of a dependency that is more fully
characterized in terms of a strong supervenience relation. More specifically, it characterizes a
part of the dependency which abstracts away from the totality facts.
It is important to get clear on the claim being defended. The idea is not that if X weakly
supervenes on Y, then there is some set of properties Z such that X strongly supervenes on Y
together with Z. This is trivial, for X strongly supervenes on Y together with X. Rather, the
claim is that when merely a weak supervenience relation obtains, it obtains in virtue of a
dependency between the X properties, the Y properties, and some T properties, where these T
properties capture a totality fact, i.e., a fact about the world that doesn’t reduce to facts about
particular parts of the world.

9

This, of course, is just what we’ve seen in our examples. At some worlds, all individuals
who are 7’-11” are the tallest individuals of the world, whereas at other worlds, all who are 7’11” are not the tallest in the world, and never do you find a world containing two individuals
who are 7’-11”, one who is the tallest and the other who is not. This is unsurprising since to
know whether someone is the tallest in the world you have to know not only their height but also
the height of the tallest person in the world. If we wish to abstract away from the fact that being
the tallest in the world depends on the height of the tallest person in the world we can instead
employ the world-relative generalization that being the tallest in the world depends solely on
one’s height.

Weak Supervenience and Modal Force
We can now apply these ideas to Kim’s claim that weak supervenience does not qualify
as a form of dependence since weak supervenience “works only within a single world at a time:
[if the mental weakly supervenes on the physical,] the fact that mentality is distributed in a
certain way in one world has absolutely no effect on how it might be distributed in another
world.”17

I take it that Kim reasons as follows: if A properties weakly supervene on B

properties, then at each world, including the actual world, this rules out some distributions of A
and B properties, viz., those with two individuals having the same B properties but different A
properties. So long as this requirement is met at each world, there is no additional restriction of
how A and B properties must be distributed at the actual world based upon how they are
distributed at other worlds. This contrasts with strong supervenience where an individual having
one set of A and B properties at another world rules out an individual at this world having the
same B properties and yet different A properties. Thus, this lack of a tie between worlds “makes
weak [supervenience] unsuitable for any dependency thesis with modal force.”18 Of course, one
might insist that supervenience relations are functional relations and not dependency relations, so

17“Supervenience
18 “Supervenience

as a Philosophical Concept”, p. 143; see also, “Concepts of Supervenience”, pp. 58-64.
as a Philosophical Concept”, p. 143.
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it matters little if weak supervenience only gives us a partial characterization of a dependency,
one that leaves open that A properties do not always depend upon B properties in this way.
Setting this aside, however, I think Kim’s reasoning is flawed since weak supervenience does
have the sort of modal force he wants.
If we were dealing with the Lewisian notion of abundant properties, where any set of
possible individuals is a property, Kim’s claim would hold. Since every set of possibilia is an
abundant property, how could knowing which individuals at one world are members of some
arbitrary set tell you which members of another world are also members, given only the
restriction that at each world the A properties that an individual instantiates be a function of the
B properties it instantiates? But we’re concerned with the properties we know and talk about,
and these instead pick out at least somewhat natural properties.19 If these weren’t at least
somewhat natural, it would never make sense to ask for an explanation of a generalization. For
example, drinking HCl will kill you. Why do we think this? If the property of being HCl and
the property of being disposed to kill a person when consumed were not somewhat natural
properties, all of our evidence from, e.g., past times when people have drunk HCl and died will
give us no reason at all to assume there is any connection between the two, since for any two
properties connected in some way (e.g., by laws), there are gazillions of pairs of abundant
properties that comprise all of the same instances up until the present but different ones
afterwards. The fact that we think there is some connection between these properties shows that
we take these properties to be fairly natural. Even if HCl doesn’t always kill one who drinks it,
or even if the correlation between death and the drinking of HCl is accidental, we nonetheless
take it that there will be an explanation of why HCl does or doesn’t kill one who drinks it. This
shows that the property of being HCl is at least fairly natural.

19 I

mean to include essentially all properties we talk about, even, e.g., the property of being grue. I do not mean to
include, in contrast, properties such as that which holds of all green objects at this world and all blue objects at all
other worlds.
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But this means there must be some explanation of why at each and every world A
properties are a function of B properties. And the answer we’ve seen, presupposing that such a
pattern across modal space does have an explanation, is that there is some dependency between
the A properties, on the one hand, and some totality fact together with B properties, on the other.
Thus, if the mental weakly supervenes on the physical, an individual’s mental properties are a
world-independent function of its physical properties and of some totality fact of the world. The
distribution of physical and mental properties at other worlds fixes the relevant totality fact and
the world-independent function f such that any individual’s mental properties are a function f of
its physical properties and of the value of T at the individual’s world. Hence, if the mental
weakly supervenes on the physical, how mentality is distributed with respect to the physical in
worlds other than w fixes how the mental is distributed with respect to the physical in w. Weak
supervenience does, pace Kim, capture this aspect of dependence.20

II: Characterizing Global Supervenience
The intuitive notion of global supervenience was distinguished from other forms of
supervenience in Kim’s “Concepts of Supervenience.”21 A globally supervenes on B iff worlds
that are alike in their distribution of B properties are alike in their distribution of A properties.
Cashed out in terms of functions, A globally supervenes on B iff the way A properties are
distributed at any world is a function of the way B properties are distributed at that world. How
exactly to spell out a ‘way properties are distributed at a world’ has been debated, but it seems
there is now agreement. McLaughlin and Paull have independently touted a definition, which
has been widely embraced, relying upon the notion of an X-isomorphism.22 The rough idea is

20Supervenience

claims do not capture the aspect of dependency we think of as ontological priority, as Kim points
out, though this is a separate issue. See “Supervenience as a Philosophical Concept,” pp. 144-147; and “Postscripts
on Supervenience,” pp. 165ff.
21Kim

lists several prior uses of this “approach to analyzing supervenience.” See “Concepts of Supervenience”, p.

68.
22McLaughlin,

“Supervenience, Vagueness, and Determination,” p. 214; Paull, “Property Supervenience”
(University of Massachusetts Doctoral Dissertation), chapter 5.
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that an X-isomorphism between world w and world w* is a one-to-one mapping from all
individuals of w onto all individuals of w* such that only X-twins are mapped.

Global

supervenience is then easily defined.
Global Supervenience: A properties globally supervene on B properties =df for any
possible worlds w and w*, every B-isomorphism between w and w* is also an Aisomorphism.23
For most supervenience relations it makes no sense to include relations among the relata, but
with global supervenience this will shortly become essential. To that end, we need a definition
of an X-isomorphism that includes relations as well as one-place properties. Sider gives us
exactly what is needed:
Where A is a set of properties and relations, say that a function, f, is an A-isomorphism iff f is oneto-one, and for every n-place relation, R, in A (count properties as 1-place relations) and any n
objects in f's domain, those n objects stand in R iff their images under f stand in R.24

Restricting ourselves to cases not involving relations — since weak supervenience is not
defined for relations — we can see that, pace Kim, the global supervenience of A properties on B
properties entails their weak supervenience. 25 Consider any two individuals x and y that are B23 Both

McLaughlin (“Supervenience, Vagueness, and Determination”) and Paull (“Property Supervenience”) have
suggested further discriminations, calling the relation I define ‘strong global supervenience.’ For ‘weak global
supervenience’ McLaughlin offers the following definition: A weakly globally supervenes on B iff for any possible
worlds w and w*, if there is a B-isomorphism between w and w*, then there is also an A-isomorphism between
them. Some have also proposed what Bennett calls ‘Middling Global Supervenience’: A middlingly globally
supervenes on B iff for any possible worlds w and w*, if there is a B-isomorphism between w and w*, then there is
an isomorphism between w and w* that is both a B-isomorphism and an A-isomorphism (see her “Global
Supervenience and Dependence” and, for an earlier proposal of this relation, Shagrir’s “Global Supervenience,
Coincident Entities and Anti-Individualism”). Because what they call ‘strong global supervenience’ has been more
widely wielded, and because weak and middling global supervenience are weaker, and therefore more likely to be
useful according to me, I will restrict my comments on weak and middling global supervenience to footnotes. See
Sider's “Global Supervenience and Identity Across Time” for reason to think maybe weak global supervenience and
middling global supervenience are important and Bennett’s “Global Supervenience and Dependence” for interesting
considerations to the contrary.
24 "Global Supervenience

and Identity Across Times and Worlds," pp. 915.

25 Shagrir

(‘‘More on Global Supervenience’’, § IV) follows Kim in thinking there is no entailment. Why does Kim
deny the entailment? I see two plausible explanations. First, the original idea of global supervenience was that any
two worlds that are indiscernible with respect to B properties are indiscernible with respect to A properties. As
noted, philosophers troubled over how to spell out indiscernibility between worlds with respect to some set of
properties. As Louis deRosset has pointed out (in conversation), however, the definition of global supervenience
now widely accepted, that requiring that any B-isomorphism between two worlds also be an A-isomorphism, departs
from the original idea. For however one spells out indiscernibility, it seems that a world and itself should be
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twins at any world w. The one-to-one mapping from the individuals of w onto the individuals of
w that maps each individual to itself except for mapping x and y to each other will be a Bisomorphism. If A globally supervenes on B then it must also be an A-isomorphism, which
means that x and y will also be A-twins. Hence, A would also weakly supervene on B.
We must be cautious when talking about the worldwide 'distribution' of B properties and
relations, since this common way of spelling out global supervenience can be misleading. To see
the point, consider the simple case in which there are only B properties, not B relations. If there
are n B properties, then there are up to 2n combinations of B properties that any individual can
have, since it either instantiates or doesn't instantiate each of those n B properties. In each world,
each of the 2n combinations of B properties is instantiated by some number of individuals (from
none to all). When philosophers speak of how the B properties are ‘distributed’ among the
individuals at some world w, they're speaking simply of the number (rather than, e.g., the spatiotemporal distribution) of individuals at w that instantiate each of the 2n combinations of B
properties. Worlds with three individuals and four independent properties, A, B, C, and D, can
have any of 163 distributions of the 16 (24) combinations of properties: all three individuals can
have none of these properties, one can have A and the other two have none, all can have only C
and D, etc.

indiscernible. Thus, in any model with a single world, it seems that any set of properties should globally supervene
on any other. But this doesn’t hold for the definition given. And, in fact, the argument given for global
supervenience entailing weak supervenience trades on the multitude of mappings from a world to itself, so such an
argument won’t work with the original notion of global supervenience (though this does not show that there is not an
entailment).
Thus, one reason Kim sees no entailment is that he is working with a different notion of global supervenience (even
if the relation is, perhaps, equivalent). A second plausible reason Kim finds no entailment, though, is that Kim may
have confused this lack of formal entailment with a lack of an entailment simpliciter. Kim’s argument against the
entailment consists in finding a world that is compatible with the definition of the one sort of supervenience but not
with the definition of the other. This neglects the rest of logical space, though, leaving open the question of whether
the existence of the world he describes necessitates the existence of other worlds that are incompatible with global
supervenience. That is, Kim has at most shown that his definition of global supervenience does not formally entail
his definition of weak supervenience. (Paull and Sider (“In Defense of Global Supervenience,” p. 835-841) uncover
the same sort of error with an argument made by Bradford Petrie (which Kim also endorses) that global does not
entail strong supervenience.)
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As With Weak, So Too Global
Much the same reasoning that showed an equivalence between weak and strong
supervenience for intrinsic properties shows the equivalence of global and strong supervenience
for intrinsic properties.26 If strong supervenience fails, there must be two individuals b and c
with the same B properties yet different A properties. Applying the Recombination Principle,
there must be a world w containing duplicates of b and c. If A and B properties are intrinsic
properties, however, the isomorphism that maps each individual of w to itself except mapping b
and c to each other will be a B-isomorphism but not an A-isomorphism.
supervenience fails.

Thus global

That is, for intrinsic properties global supervenience entails strong

supervenience. And, since the reverse entailment holds, global and strong supervenience are
26 A

similar sort of argument using an isolation principle appears in Paull and Sider’s “In Defense of Global
Supervenience,” pp. 838-9, though their argument explicitly doesn’t handle cases involving individuals with proper
parts. Bennett also argues that global and strong supervenience are equivalent for intrinsic properties in “Global
Supervenience and Dependence”. However, her argument relies on understanding strong supervenience as requiring
all possible B-twins to be A-twins, where x and y are -twins iff “there is a –preserving isomorphism between
their parts” (p. 522, italics added). She suggests that this is the natural way to spell out strong supervenience since
the indiscernibility of individuals required for strong supervenience would then be defined analogously to the
indiscernibility of worlds required for global supervenience and that otherwise it would be “much easier for
individuals to be –indiscernible than for worlds to be” (p. 523n26). But, say I, we don’t want analogous types of
indiscernibility for strong and for global supervenience, for with strong supervenience we don’t care about the
individuals’ parts. When comparing worlds, we can’t want them to be alike in their properties, since worlds don’t
have properties in many cases (as she points out). Rather, we’re interested in them being alike in all ways
regarding what is going on in the worlds. With individuals, in contrast, we’re interested simply in the properties
of the individuals themselves. The mental strongly supervening on the neuronal says, intuitively, that any two
possible individuals that have the same system of neurons will have the same beliefs, desires, etc. It doesn’t say,
e.g., that any two possible individuals that have the same system of neurons made up of the same number of parts
will have the same beliefs. Similarly, saying that weight on Earth strongly supervenes on mass says, intuitively, that
any two possible individuals with the same mass will have the same weight on Earth, not that any two possible
individuals with the same number of parts, every one of which has the same mass as its counterpart in the other
individual, will have the same weight on Earth. Yet this is what would be required if strong supervenience required
a –preserving isomorphism between individuals. I therefore think Bennett’s argument for the equivalence of
global and strong supervenience fails to handle what is tricky about global supervenience, viz. cases in which the
individuals have proper parts.
(Even if Bennett’s argument does work, the conclusion needs to be restricted at least to cases in which the
subvenience base excludes properties that have both an intrinsic and an extrinsic component. She considers two
possible individuals a and b that are B-twins but not A-twins and, using an isolation principle, generates worlds with
their duplicates, a* and b*. She says that “although a* and b* may have new B-properties that a and b do not
have—perhaps being isolated is a B-property, for example—they would clearly have the same ones. Thus the Bindiscernibility of a and b entails the B-indiscernibility of a* and b*” (p. 525). However, consider the property of
being 6’ tall or being near a poodle. If individual a has this property in virtue of being 6’ tall and individual b has
this property in virtue of being near a poodle, a* would have this property and b* wouldn’t, so the B-indiscernibility
of a* and b* does not follow from the B-indiscernibility of a and b.)
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equivalent for intrinsic properties. As before we can extend the equivalence to local extrinsic
properties since we can recombine chunks of space-time containing individuals rather than just
the individuals themselves.
We have already seen that if A weakly supervenes on B, then there is some set T of
totality properties such that A strongly supervenes on B ∪ T. While this helps us understand the
general nature of weak supervenience, it does not mean that claims of weak supervenience can
be jettisoned in favor of corresponding claims of strong supervenience, for in any interesting
case in which we know that A weakly supervenes on B, we won’t know which totality properties
make up the corresponding strong supervenience claim. Not so with global supervenience.
A totality fact distinguishes each class of B-isomorphic worlds. We saw that with weak
supervenience a totality fact specifies a class of worlds at which the function from B properties
to A properties is fixed. So too, one might reason, with global supervenience we have a totality
fact that specifies a class of worlds at which the function from B properties to A properties is
fixed. However, because global supervenience relates sets containing not only properties but
also relations, this will not in general hold, for the B relations can help to fix which individuals at
a world have a particular A property. Thus, to fix the individuals that have a certain A property
at a class of worlds, we must restrict ourselves not only to those that have certain B properties
but also those that have the right position within the nexus of B relations. We can do this by
taking into account an individual’s B relational properties, or, in other words, properties that can
be defined using a combination of quantification, logical operators, B relations, and B properties.
For example, if being taller than is a B relation, and having a mass of 1kg is a B property, being
taller than someone would be a B relational property, as would being taller than someone who is
taller than someone with a mass of 1kg. Thus, at any class c of B-isomorphic worlds, an
individual’s A properties are a function fc of its B relational properties.

But, because an

individual’s B relational properties determine which class of worlds it belongs to, an individual’s
A properties are at all worlds a function f of its B relational properties.

The globally

supervening set also might contain relations, but again we can capture the same information by
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considering relational properties instead of relations. Thus, A globally supervenes on B iff the
set of A relational properties strongly supervenes on the set of B relational properties. The
appendix gives an informal proof of this result building on Stalnaker’s earlier proof.27 His
original proof doesn’t consider A or B relations, which are important not only for generality but
also because most claims of global supervenience do include relations among the relata.

Global Supervenience and Modal Force
We have already considered Kim’s argument that weak supervenience cannot capture an
important aspect of dependency, viz. that what obtains in one world has implications for what
obtains in another. Kim makes much the same argument for global supervenience, and this fails
for much the same reasons.28 If A globally supervenes on B, then this is so in virtue of an
underlying dependency that guarantees that any possible individual’s A properties are a function
f of its B relational properties. If this pattern holds at one other world, then this means little for
the actual world, but if this pattern holds over all other worlds, the only explanation, given that
we’re dealing with fairly natural properties, is that the nature of the properties we’re considering
guarantees this pattern. Thus, the distribution of A and B properties and relations at other worlds
dictates the distribution of A and B properties and relations at this world. Global supervenience
does, pace Kim, capture this aspect of dependence.29

27 “Varieties

of Supervenience,” p. 238. See also Bennett’s “Global Supervenience and Dependence,” §§ 2-3.

28“‘Strong’

and ‘Global’ Supervenience Revisited,” pp. 83-84; “The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism,” pp. 277279. Taking his cue from Kim, Shagrir also holds that global supervenience “imposes no intra-world dependency
relation.” (See Shagrir’s “More on Global Supervenience.”)
29Using

an isolation principle, Paull and Sider also argue that global supervenience imposes an intra-world
dependency relation. However, their argument assumes that, e.g., the property of having a mind is in some way an
intrinsic property; either it is an intrinsic property of the person in question or there is some intrinsic property of
some larger portion of the world which entails that this very part (the person) has a mind. This, however, neglects
the very real possibility that having a mind is dependent upon totality facts such as the laws. See “In Defense of
Global Supervenience,” pp. 843-844.
Bennett makes an argument similar to Kim’s. She claims that middling and weak global supervenience are not
dependencies and hence neither of them is interesting or important. Her argument is based upon the observation that
“It is clear from the definitions given above that both [middling global supervenience] and [weak global
supervenience] ... permit the existence of worlds between which there is a B-preserving isomorphism that is not also
A-preserving” (“Global Supervenience and Dependence,” p. 509; cf. pp. 515-6). But while the definitions don’t
formally entail that there is no such isomorphism, this leaves open the possibility that there is some metaphysically
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Both Kim’s arguments that weak and global supervenience lack “modal force,” and my
rebuttal are important in understanding supervenience, but Kim is also taking aim at larger game,
Davidson’s anomalous monism.30 Famously, Davidson “denies that there are psychophysical
laws” yet thinks “that mental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or supervenient, on
physical characteristics.”31 Kim argues that strong supervenience entails psychophysical laws
yet weak and global supervenience lack the modal force necessary to capture the required sense
of dependence. Thus, says Kim, “We must conclude that supervenience is not going to deliver to
us a viable form of nonreductive materialism.”32

We can see now, however, that Kim’s

conclusion is premature. Weak and global supervenience do carry modal force, and thus the way
is still open for those, like Davidson, seeking some form of nonreductive materialism. As we
will see, though, we have other reasons for judging Davidson’s supervenience claim implausible.

III: Why Weak and Global Supervenience are Useless
We now have a better understanding of what weak and global supervenience relations are
functionally as well as what is required to have merely a weak or global supervenience relation.
For A to weakly supervene on B, at each world there must be a function such that which A
properties an individual has is a function of which B properties it has. For A to globally
supervene on B, the A relational properties a possible individual has must be a function of the B
relational properties it has. If A merely weakly supervenes on B, the dependency underlying the
supervenience relation involves a totality fact such that at all worlds A is a function of B ∪ T,

necessary principle, such as those we’ve already seen and which Bennett herself uses, that precludes it. As Bennett
urges (in correspondence), this nonetheless shifts the burden, for unless someone comes up with such a principle, we
have good reason to think such isomorphisms are precluded. Pursuing the strategy in the text, however, we can ask
why middling or weak global supervenience holds between the A and B properties across all worlds. Clearly, there
is some connection between the A and B properties. What sort of connection would be required? It is not clear
what sort of connection is required, and thus it is not clear whether this connection would guarantee that A
properties also strongly globally supervene on B properties. Thus, while I agree with Bennett that the lack of a
formal entailment is a good prima facie justification, in the end I don’t think we have any better reason for thinking
that isomorphisms that are B- but not A-preserving are permitted than for thinking the contrary.
30“Supervenience

as a Philosophical Concept,” p. 143.

31“Mental Events,”
32“The

p. 214.

Myth of Nonreductive Materialism,” p. 279.
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where T is a set of totality properties. If A and B do not include relations, similar reasoning
shows that A will merely globally supervene on B iff A is a function of B ∪ T, where T is a set
of totality properties constructed using quantification, logical operators, and B properties. But
cases of mere global supervenience are even easier to find since any global supervenience
relation involving relations will, by definition, be merely global. A supervenience relation that is
merely global in virtue of there being supervening or subvening relations is of little interest,
though, since we convey the same information using a strong supervenience claim cashed out in
terms of relational properties.
I will now apply these results to argue that weak and global supervenience are useless. A
supervenience relation is useful only if it can help us to characterize a dependency we do not
entirely understand. If we understand a dependency, we state the dependency itself rather than a
less informative, rather obscure supervenience claim that holds in virtue of that dependency.
Rather than saying that gravitational force globally supervenes across all nomologically
accessible worlds on mass and distance between individuals, we state the law of gravity: F =
Gm1m2/r2. If we don’t understand the relationship between two sets of properties — if we don’t
know if, or how, one set depends upon the other — then a supervenience claims allows us to cut
up logical space, drawing a line in the sand between various accounts of that relationship. In
saying that the mental supervenes upon the physical, one rules out that the mental varies
independently of the physical, as substance dualists and some property dualists hold, though one
leaves open whether mental terms simply mean something physical, as some logical behaviorists
claimed, whether mental terms refer to something we will discover to be physical, as identity
theorists held, or even whether psychophysical parallelism or epiphenomenalism are true. In this
way supervenience relations, at least of some stripe, are useful.
A particular type of supervenience relation is useful only if for all we know some
dependency we are trying to understand might satisfy it but not satisfy a stronger and simpler
type of supervenience. We can formulate all sorts of new-fangled supervenience relations, but if
there are no dependencies we are struggling to understand that could satisfy these relations, then
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they serve no purpose. Similarly, if there are dependencies that do or even might satisfy a
particular type of supervenience relation but that also satisfy a stronger and simpler
supervenience relation, then characterizing the dependency with the weaker relation would be
uninformative and even misleading. I claim that because of the unappreciated strength of weak
and global supervenience, in any interesting case in which a set of properties A weakly or
globally supervenes upon a set B, A will also strongly supervene upon B. That is, there are no
interesting cases of mere weak or global supervenience. Thus, claims of weak and global
supervenience should be dispensed with in favor of the stronger and more informative claim of
strong supervenience.
It is not difficult to defend our use of strong supervenience. For example, we can see
how the mental could strongly supervene on the physical. As we’ve seen, there could be
metaphysical or semantic dependencies in virtue of which claims about certain physical
properties entail claims about mental properties. Our use of weak and global supervenience,
however, is not so easy to defend. How could some of an individual’s properties be a function of
other of its properties where this function varies from world to world? Perhaps even worse, how
can the properties that this instantiates be a function of, inter alia, the properties that that
instantiates or the relation this bears to that, as we would have with mere global supervenience?
In assessing the usefulness of weak and global supervenience, one way I will depart from
previous assessments is in restricting my attention to the sorts of dependencies that we currently
are, or in the future could be, seeking to understand. The property of belonging to a world
containing more rats than one has arms weakly, but not strongly, supervenes on the number of
arms one has.

Similarly, the property of being the tallest in the world merely globally

supervenes on heights. Simply because of the semantics of ‘-est’, ‘belonging to a world of . . .’,
and other such expressions, we can use the combinatorics of our language to generate predicates
for all sorts of supervenience claims. These predicates show that global supervenience does not
entail strong and that weak supervenience does not entail global in general. In these cases,
however, the supervenience claims are of no use since the predicates themselves wear the
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dependencies of the properties on their sleeves. To be useful, a kind of supervenience relation
must be able to help characterize the relationship between two sets of properties when we don’t
know how, or perhaps even if, the one set depends upon the other. Thus, instead of looking at
artificial, semantically transparent dependencies we will be concerned with such relations as that
between the moral and the natural, the modal and the non-modal, the mental and the physical,
and (in the debate over physicalism) the actual and the physical. I will argue that weak and
global supervenience are of no use in characterizing relations such as these.
I will take for granted that each of these relations involves a dependency. If there is no
dependency involved, then the one set of properties would float free of the other, no
supervenience relation would obtain and, hence, there would be no basis for justifying a type of
supervenience claim. Further, I will assume that each of these dependencies can be explained. I
assume this for two reasons. First, it seems quite unlikely that these dependencies are brute; e.g.,
the whole project of constructing an ethical theory presupposes there is an account of the
dependency. Second, even if one of these dependencies is brute, it seems implausible that we
could have any reason for thinking that a particular type of supervenience relation obtains in
virtue of that brute dependency. Thus, an account of these currently murky dependencies would
explain them, and this is done in terms of simpler dependencies that we better understand, such
as lawful, semantic, or functional dependencies.
We have a fair grasp of lawful dependencies. One property holding in virtue of another
requires that the latter, perhaps hand in hand with other conditions, lawfully necessitates the
former. We also understand generally what some might call a semantic dependency, as when we
say that a person is a bachelor in virtue of being both unmarried and male. For those unafraid of
analyticities, ‘bachelor’ just means unmarried male, and therefore the term ‘bachelor’ picks out
the property of being both male and unmarried.

We also understand how a higher-order

functional property can depend upon lower-ordered properties. A functional property is the
property of having a (lower-order) property that is playing a certain causal role.

Thus, a

functional property is instantiated in virtue of the instantiation of a lower-ordered property, viz.,
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that which is playing the specified role. Finally, identity might be considered a degenerate case
of a dependency.
My strategy will be to examine these four relatively well understood dependencies,
arguing for each that if it underlies the less understood dependencies we’re seeking to
understand, then these less understood dependencies cannot be usefully characterized with
claims either of weak or global supervenience. In each case a relation would obtain that can be
more informatively characterized using a strong supervenience claim.
The point is easiest to see with identity. A set of properties that is identical with another
will strongly supervene on it.

Yet what we need to justify our use of weak or global

supervenience relations are cases where we have merely weak or global supervenience. Thus, if
identity underlies a dependency we’re seeking to understand, e.g. if we knew that moral
properties just are natural properties, then claims of weak and global supervenience would not
help in our characterization of that dependency.

Similarly, if a straightforward semantic

dependency underlies the dependencies we’re seeking to understand, this won’t give us a merely
weak or global supervenience relation. If a term ‘X’ means being this, that, and the other, then
the property of being X will strongly supervene on the properties of being this, being that, and
being the other. The next two sections consider the possibility that lawful relations or functional
relations underlie the dependencies we’re seeking to understand. Ultimately we’ll see that even
in these cases we can more perspicuously characterize these dependencies using claims of strong
supervenience.

Although I only consider identity and lawful, functional, and semantic

dependencies, I will suggest that what would be required to have a mere weak or global
supervenience relation makes it unlikely that there is some other sort of underlying dependency
that will do the trick.

Why Law-Governed Dependencies Can’t Underlie Mere Weak Supervenience
It may seem that a lawful relation between the instantiations of one property and the
instantiations of another would be perfectly suited to underwrite a mere weak or global
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supervenience relation between those properties, for the function from the one property to the
other will vary from world to world as the laws that connect them vary. For example, if there are
psychophysical laws, the mental would be a function of the physical at this world, and at some
other world, where there are different psychophysical laws, the mental would be a different
function of the physical. In addition, the mental properties of this could be a function of, inter
alia, the physical properties of that. So far we have exactly what is needed for mere weak or
global supervenience. However, as long as the psychophysical laws are contingent, then there
will be some worlds where the mental is not a function of the physical, where the mental varies
independently of the physical, perhaps being brute or perhaps being determined by, e.g., the
ectoplasmic. A world in which Cartesian dualism obtains, for example, would be a world where
the mental is not a function of the physical, and yet if the tie between the mental and the physical
holds in virtue of contingent laws, then Cartesian dualism is metaphysically possible. This
possibility, though, conflicts with weak and global supervenience since these require that at each
world the mental be some function of the physical. So far, then, we haven't found a dependency
that would underlie a merely weak or global supervenience relation.
However, if the laws are necessary, as some insist, then laws that tie the mental to the
physical, e.g., would ensure that the mental is a function of the physical at all worlds and, hence,
ensure that there won’t be any problematic worlds where there are no psychophysical laws and
the mental floats free of the physical. Those who think the laws are contingent can similarly
avoid the problematic worlds by restricting their claims of mere weak or global supervenience to
worlds with the same laws as ours. But if all worlds of concern have the same laws as ours, then
A properties that are a law-governed function only of B properties would strongly supervene on
them.

Thus, a merely weak supervenience relation holding in virtue of an individual’s A

properties depending upon its B properties would have to hold in virtue of those A properties
also depending upon some totality fact.

Similarly, a merely global supervenience relation

holding in virtue of an individual’s A properties depending upon its B properties would have to
have hold in virtue of those A properties also depending upon the B properties of other
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individuals or, more plausibly, the B properties of other individuals together with the B relations
it bears to these other individuals.
Since it is quite common for an individual’s properties to depend on its relations to other
individuals, lawful relations plausibly can underlie mere global supervenience relations. It
doesn’t look, though, as if lawful dependencies can similarly underlie mere weak supervenience
relations, for mere weak supervenience requires an individual’s properties to depend upon some
sort of totality fact, and it is hard to see what could fit the bill. The initial attraction of lawful
dependencies was that laws can be the totality facts we need since the laws vary from world to
world, but once we restrict ourselves to worlds with the same laws as ours, we’re left without the
required totality fact. For A to merely weakly supervene on B at worlds with our laws, an
individual’s properties would have to be determined by its other properties and some global state
of the universe that is not fixed by the laws. Perhaps there is some more complex type of
dependency involving the laws that could fill the bill, but so far we haven’t found what we need.

Why Functionalism Can’t Underlie Mere Weak Or Global Supervenience
So far we haven’t found a dependency that could underlie mere weak supervenience
relations, though we have found that law-governed relations, if they involve some totality facts,
could underlie mere global supervenience relations. Functionalism, however, seems ideally
suited to underlie both weak and global supervenience relations.33 Unfortunately, it won’t quite
do the job, and understanding why will help us to see why other sorts of dependencies will also
fall short.
I begin with an incorrect characterization of functionalism (incorrect since it requires
realizers to be physical rather than allowing them to be any lower-order state): A mental property
is the property of having some physical property that is causally connected in the right way to
other specific mental and physical properties. To give a toy example, the property of believing

33Loewer

seems to suggest functionalism as a way of making sense of global supervenience (or, more accurately,
strong supervenience with relational properties) in “An Argument for Strong Supervenience,” p. 223.
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that it is hot is the property of having some physical property (e.g., a firing pattern in certain
neurons of the brain) that 1) causes the belief that it is not cold, 2) causes, together with a belief
that heat kills ogres, the belief that any ogres are being killed, 3) is caused by heat, etc. Thus, the
physical properties at a world together with the causal relations between them fix the mental
properties at that world. And which mental properties this has (e.g., the property of believing
that it is hot) depends, inter alia, upon which physical properties that has (e.g., the property of
being hot that the surrounding air has). Finally, an individual’s mental properties are a function
of the physical properties to which it is causally connected; therefore, since the laws of causality,
and thus what a state is causally connected to, vary from world to physically identical world, so
too will the function from a) an individual’s physical properties and how it is spatio-temporally
related to other physical properties, to b) that individual’s mental properties. In sum, we seem to
have exactly what is required for a mere weak or global supervenience relation.34
Earlier we considered whether psychophysical laws might underpin weak or global
supervenience relations, and we found a problem. If mental properties are nomologically a
function of physical properties but metaphysically independent of them, then at worlds where
there are no such laws the mental need not be a function of the physical, precluding weak and
global supervenience.

With functionalism, however, we have no such problem, for it is

constitutive of a mental property that it be causally related in the right way with other physical
and mental properties. Thus, if there are no relevant laws at a world, then in virtue of what it is
to be a mental property, individuals at such worlds could not have mental properties. So the
problem we found with contingent laws does not arise. Functionalism avoids the Charybdis of
mere metaphysical dependencies and the Scylla of mere nomological dependencies by

34 It seems

that with this functionalist account, at each world an individual’s mental properties are a function of its
physical properties and relations, since any possible individual’s mental properties are determined by its physical
properties and relations together with the laws at that world. Thus, the mental would at least weakly supervene on
the physical. But does the mental globally supervene on the physical? That is, would fixing only the physical fix
the mental? Presumably, only if the physical properties and relations at a world fix the laws. Those who endorse
Humean Supervenience argue that the spatio-temporal distribution of physical properties does fix the laws. Thus, it
so far seems that functionalist accounts provide a justification for the use of weak supervenience and, since some
endorse Humean Supervenience, global supervenience as well.
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combining the two, i.e. by metaphysically requiring a mental property to be some physical
property having certain nomological relations to other physical properties.
Unfortunately, however, the above justification of weak and global supervenience won’t
work. First, functionalism isn't the having of some physical property. Rather, functionalism
specifies a mental property as the having of a lower-order property that is causally connected to
other specific properties.35 Thus, the having of some non-physical property causally connected
in the right way would qualify as a mental property, and, hence, the world-wide distribution of
mental properties is not a function of the world-wide distribution of physical properties. In
addition, even if we have a physical state (e.g., high ambient temperature) causing a physically
realized mental state (e.g., the belief that it’s hot), a non-physical state can occur anywhere along
this causal chain.36
Many properties are constituted, in part, by certain causal connections.

And such

constitutive lawful connections are just what are needed to give us a dependency on a totality
fact, for at worlds with different laws, the function from the subvening to the supervening
properties likewise differs. However, these lawful connections can be satisfied by a causal chain
containing any sort of lower-order properties, so an adequate subvenience base must include
them all and, thus, become trivial. Functionalism therefore isn’t able to provide the sort of
dependency we need.37 The same reasoning applies to functional accounts of the moral, the
modal, etc. Unfortunately, however, it is hard to see what sort of dependency could underlie
weak or global supervenience other than lawful dependencies and functionally defined

35Thanks

to Adam Wager for reminding me of this.

36 In

fact, non-physical states can enter into the picture even in the specification of a mental state; for example, a
belief that one is near an ectoplasmic field would, on a functionalist account, be specified as, inter alia, a lower-order
state that is caused by a nearby ectoplasmic field.
37 While

functionalism cannot underlie a mere weak or global supervenience relation, one might protest that there is
an account of the relation of the mental to the physical that can, and that is the account just sketched, viz., that which
is like functionalism but requires all realizers, all causal chains, and all objects of belief to be physical. To be a basis
for a justification of weak or global supervenience, such an account would have to have at least some plausibility.
This account, or any similar account for moral properties or other properties we’re trying to understand, is not at all
plausible. How could it be constitutive of a mental property to be physically realized or, worse, to be causally
connected only via physical properties?
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dependencies. It looks, then, as if a) there simply isn't a dependency that could underlie mere
weak supervenience relations, and b) only lawful relations could underlie global supervenience
relations.

Why Weak Supervenience is Useless
We have, then, one argument that claims of weak supervenience are useless. For sets of
properties related by identity or semantic, lawful, or functional dependencies, if the one set
weakly supervenes on the other, it strongly supervenes on it. Yet it is hard to see what other sort
of dependency could underlie the relations between properties philosophers are struggling to
understand. Hence, any claim of weak supervenience should be set aside in favor of a claim of
strong supervenience which is more informative and less obscure. This argument does rely,
however, on the assumption that we haven’t overlooked some other sort of dependency that
might underlie a mere weak supervenience relation. So let’s now turn to a second argument.
We’re trying to determine whether the dependencies philosophers are studying are
relations between families of properties that satisfy merely weak supervenience. Remember that
this requires an individual’s A properties be a function of both its B properties and some totality
fact, i.e., a fact about the world that varies from world to world. Moreover, an individual’s A
and/or B properties must hold in virtue of this totality fact. The problem is that a dependence
upon a totality fact is of necessity a very superficial connection whereas the families of
properties philosophers are striving to understand involve a much more intimate tie to that upon
which they depend.
It is certainly easy to have a supervening property of an individual depend upon that
individual’s subvening properties.

My mental properties, e.g., no doubt depend upon my

physical properties. We can also see how a thing’s supervening properties can depend upon the
properties of spatio-temporally related individuals. The skydiver’s acceleration depends upon
her spatial relation to the Earth.
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But what sort of mental, modal, or moral property of a thing depends upon the properties
of other individuals that bear no special relation to it or that bear merely an intrinsic relation to
it? It seems I could have a particular belief or desire about Gandhi, e.g., only in virtue of bearing
a fairly intimate relation to him. Intrinsic relations don’t seem to be enough, for intrinsic
relations obtain merely in virtue of the properties of the relata; thus, my bearing an intrinsic
relation to something just means that I have some property and something — wherever it might
be ‘out there’ — has a related property. I do, of course, have some properties in virtue of my
intrinsic relations to other individuals. For example, I have the property of not being the tallest
person in the world, but this just means that I have a certain height and there’s someone who has
a height that is greater. Mental, moral, and modal properties don’t seem to hold merely in virtue
of these insubstantial sorts of relations. 38 If there were a twelve foot tall person in some distant,
unrelated corner of the universe, Leonid Stadnik wouldn’t be the tallest person, but no matter
what exists in that corner of the universe and no matter what properties it has, I would still be
believing that two plus two is four and my saving of the drowning girl would still be a virtuous

38 Advocates

of regularity theories of laws will insist that my mental properties do depend upon the properties
instantiated in distant unrelated corners of the universe, for, they say, it is the world-wide distribution of properties
that determines what the laws are. Thus, what properties a seemingly unrelated individual instantiates can, in this
way, determine the laws and, hence, can determine whether it is this or that that caused my belief and, therefore,
whether it is this or that that my belief is about.
Unfortunately, this sort of dependence also won’t get us what we need for a weak supervenience relation. The
world-wide distribution of mental and physical properties may determine what the psychophysical laws are, and thus
determine that at this world the mental is a function of the physical, but at some other worlds, the distribution of the
mental and physical properties will determine that there are no psychophysical laws, and so at that world the mental
won’t be a function of the physical. Yet what is needed for weak supervenience is that at each world the mental be a
function of the physical.
Again we might avoid worries about such worlds if we think the laws are necessary, as some argue, or if our
supervenience claim is restricted to nomologically accessible worlds. If we think the laws are necessary, though, we
would be no friend of a regularity account of laws. Moreover, if all worlds, or all of concern, have our same laws,
we would lose what we need for weak supervenience, viz. a dependence on a totality fact that varies from world to
world. That is, if our supervenience claim is restricted to worlds with our laws and the relation between the mental
and the physical is lawful, then the mental will globally, if not strongly, supervene on the physical. Thus, appealing
to a regularity account of laws won’t help in our defense of weak supervenience.
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act. Merely weak supervenience is just too superficial to give us the intimate tie needed for the
dependencies of interest.39
One relation that is more intimate, and seems to play a large role at least in mental and
moral properties is the causal relation. My act is evil, many argue, because of the harm it causes.
My belief about Bush must trace back, say some, via a causal chain to Bush. Moreover, causal
relations obtain in virtue of the laws and the laws, according to a variety of accounts, look to be
totality facts. So why not say we’ve found the totality fact such that the mental/moral will
merely weakly supervene on the physical/natural? The answer, as we’ve already seen from our
look at functionalism, is that any property that holds in virtue of that causal chain must have as
its subvenience base all other properties since any sort of property could participate in a causal
chain. If I have a belief about Bush in virtue of being causally connected to Bush, then whether
or not I have this belief is a function not only of the physical and the laws, but also of the
ectoplasmic, since in some worlds I have a causal chain connecting me to Bush mediated by
ectoplasmic properties.

This is why functionalism is compatible with contingent theses of

physicalism but not with varieties of physicalism that require the mental to be a function of the
physical at all worlds. So while the laws may qualify as totality facts and while they may
provide for a more intimate relation of exactly the sort we need, any dependence on the laws is
going to be a dependence on anything the laws might govern — which is anything at all! Such a
supervenience claim would have to have every property in the base and would therefore be
trivial.
It is common for properties to depend upon spatio-temporal relations. As mentioned, the
skydiver has a particular acceleration because of the direction and distance of the Earth. Could
spatio-temporal relations therefore underlie weak supervenience relations? The short answer is
that they cannot, for properties depend upon them only insofar as they depend upon the laws. Of
course, we can construct examples of dependencies that do not hold in virtue of the laws. The

39 This

argument based upon the superficiality of ties seems somewhat less compelling as applied to the
supervenience of the modal on the non-modal.
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property of being within a meter of a negative charge globally supervenes upon charge and
spatio-temporal relations. But it seems clear that a mere spatio-temporal relation to something is
not part of what it is to give something a mental, moral, or modal property. For one thing, such
relations are arbitrary: how could whether i is exactly distance d from j determine whether i has
force F acting on it — unless, of course, some law at that world happens to say, e.g., that F =
gmimj/d2? Hence, spatio-temporal relations are unimportant in themselves and could underwrite
the dependencies we seek to understand only hand in hand with the laws.
The dependencies we find with mental, moral, or modal properties require some sort of
intimate tie to the properties upon which they depend. Causal relations and spatio-temporal
relations potentially give us that intimate tie, but they don’t give us a dependency that will
underlie a merely weak supervenience relation. And yet there doesn’t seem to be any other sort
of intimate tie that might do the trick. In short, why think the less informative and more obscure
claim of weak supervenience has any place in current philosophy? Cast it out!

Why Global Supervenience is Useless
A supervenience relation that ruled out all possible dependencies would be useless, since
no possible dependency could satisfy it and, hence, no two sets of properties could ever stand in
that relation. In addition, however, if we knew that a kind of supervenience relation ruled out all
but one possible kind of dependency, it too would be useless since stating the dependency would
be more perspicuous than stating the supervenience relation. As long as we restrict our concerns
to the sorts of relations philosophers are struggling to understand, rather than the gerrymandered
ones we can artificially construct using the combinatorics of our language, only one sort of
dependency can underlie a global supervenience relation, and that is a lawful dependency. If A
globally supervenes on B, then A lawfully depends upon B. Hence, we should not use the less
informative and more obscure supervenience claim when we can state the lawful dependency
itself.
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One might object that claims of supervenience are useful since they remain neutral about
the direction of the dependency. A can supervene on B in virtue of A depending on B, in virtue
of B depending on A, or in virtue of A and B depending on C. It thus seems that a supervenience
relation — even one that requires a particular type of dependency — is useful whenever one
wishes to state a correlation between A and B without committing to the direction of the
dependency.
Notice that this objection doesn’t rebut the charge that claims of supervenience are
recondite or opaque. Hence, if in some domain a supervenience relation does require a lawful
dependency, even if it does not require a dependency in a particular direction, it would be much
more informative to state this. One could simply say that there is a lawful dependency between
two sets of properties rather than specifying which one lawfully depends upon the other.
In addition, however, in most cases of concern the direction of the dependency is simply
not an issue.

The modal is assumed to be ‘grounded in’ the non-modal.

Likewise, the

supervenience of the moral on the natural isn’t a puzzle about the direction of the dependency
but about the nature of it. And, finally, those who claim that all actual properties globally
supervene on the physical properties are taking for granted that the physical is what determines
the actual. In these three cases, our only grip on the supervening state is through the subvening
state. We think something won’t survive flattening because we see something that was formed
by an artist and is in the shape of a statue. We think Bo did something wrong because we see
that she caused suffering. Thus, we don’t first get evidence of a correlation and then wonder
which is dependent upon which. Rather, the sole reason we think there is a correlation across all
worlds is because of our antecedent belief that the one depends upon the other.
With the relation between the mental and physical, however, it may appear that we do
have independent access to that which supervenes and that upon which it supervenes. We see
the needle enter our vein as we grimace with pain. We see Li consuming yet another Toasted
Almond and soon observe evidence of her confusion. Physical and mental correlations spurred
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mind-body theories from the beginning, so we’d like to first endorse the correlation and then
theorize about the underlying dependency.
Notice, however, that the correlations we observe are not between the relata of the
supervenience relation, i.e., not the mental states and the physical states that possibly stand in an
identity or realization relation. Rather, what we observe are correlations between the mental
states and physical states that follow each other in order, states that on most accounts are merely
causally connected. Though we seek to know whether my physical state at t is identical to or
realizes or is independent of my mental state at t, the correlations consist of a mental state at t
and physical states before or after t. Thus, Leibniz postulated a pre-established harmony not
because of any empirical evidence that mind and body are metaphysically independent but
because, he thought, there is no way to explain the mental in terms of what is merely physical
(no matter how complex a mechanism, nothing of that mechanism gives us the resources to
explain perception and consciousness). Physicalists, in contrast, reason that the physical does
provide an adequate basis for explaining the mental and thus the simplest and therefore most
likely explanation of the mental need not posit anything beyond the physical. In short, both
those who say the mental depends upon the physical and those who deny it do not come to their
conclusions by means of a prior conviction that a supervenience relation obtains. One first
determines whether there is a dependency, and one then concludes whether the mental
supervenes on the physical. Thus, supervenience claims do not provide a useful way to state
correlations one thinks to hold prior to any commitment to the direction of the underlying
dependency. One has reason to endorse a supervenience claim only insofar as one already has
reason to endorse a dependency; thus, given that a statement of a dependency is more
informative, the supervenience claim serves no purpose.
I have claimed that only one sort of dependency can underlie a global supervenience
relation, and, hence, that it would be much more informative to state the dependency itself rather
than the supervenience relation. Even if this is wrong, and even if one can have reason to posit a
global supervenience relation without having reason to posit a dependency going in a particular
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direction, one can always state the strong supervenience claim that is functionally equivalent to
it. As we have seen, if A globally supervenes on B, then A relational properties strongly
supervene on B relational properties. Bennett, who also sees global supervenience as having “no
metaphysically distinctive role”, nonetheless argues that a claim of global supervenience at least
has the advantage of brevity, since the subvenience base for the strong supervenience claim is an
extension of the base for the global supervenience claim and so it would be quite cumbersome to
state.40 This is no doubt true in the general case, but if we focus on the relations philosophers are
actually struggling to understand — such as the mental on the physical, the moral on the natural,
or the modal on the non-modal — this isn’t the case. The physical, the natural, the non-modal,
and other rich families of properties already include the sorts of properties that are required for
the expanded supervenience base, so we needn’t extend them at all to get the equivalent strong
supervenience relation. In these cases, if A globally supervenes on B, A strongly supervenes on
B.
Bennett also points out that claims of global supervenience have the advantage of making
it clear that the supervening properties are extrinsic, which can be useful.41 Since global
supervenience relations don’t require supervening properties to be extrinsic, it seems a better
way to make clear that the properties are extrinsic is simply to say so.42 Even this, however,
seems unnecessary once we consider that the relations philosophers are trying to understand are
already assumed to involve extrinsic properties; the relation needs to be clarified not when
involving extrinsic properties but instead when one goes against the fold and thinks that the
mental, the moral, or the modal are intrinsic properties.

40 “Global

Supervenience and Dependence,” pp. 506, 508.

41 “Global

Supervenience and Dependence,” p. 508.

42 For

weak and middling global supervenience, the relata arguably can be intrinsic, as we see with the intrinsic
modal properties weakly globally supervening on the intrinsic non-modal properties. With strong global
supervenience, or what we’re simply calling global supervenience, the supervening properties and relations need not
be extrinsic if the subvening properties and relations are. For example, the family of properties of being n meters
tall globally supervenes on the family of properties of belonging to a world containing m individuals n meters tall
and the relation of being taller than.
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Conclusion
Weak, global, and strong supervenience are all equivalent for intrinsic and local extrinsic
properties. Moreover, if A weakly supervenes on B then A strongly supervenes on B together
with some totality fact, and if A globally supervenes on B, then A relational properties strongly
supervene on B relational properties.
We have considered various reasons for thinking weak and global supervenience are not
useful, all based upon how strong weak and global supervenience are and, thus, how difficult it is
to have weak or global supervenience without having strong supervenience. While it is difficult
in general to have a mere weak or global supervenience relation, when dealing with the
dependencies of interest to philosophers it is impossible.

Restricting ourselves to these

dependencies, weak, global, and strong supervenience are simply equivalent. But this means
weak and global supervenience serve no purpose in our struggle to understand the dependencies
of the world philosophers are trying to understand. Schiffer claimed that supervenience relations
only serve “to add mystery to mystery, to cover one obscurantist move with another.”43 Perhaps
then, at least for weak and global supervenience, he is right.44

Appendix
What follows is an informal proof that if A globally supervenes on B, then A’ strongly
supervenes on B’, where X’, or what I have called ‘X relational properties’, are properties that
can be defined using quantification, logical operators, X properties, and X relations. I have used
quotation marks to show that the proof is based closely on the proof Stalnaker gave in “Varieties
of Supervenience,” though extended to handle cases in which A and B contain relations as well
as properties.45

43Remnants

of Meaning, p. 153-154.

44I’d

like to thank Karen Bennett, David Christensen, Troy Cross, Louis deRosset, Barry Loewer, Brian
McLaughlin, Derk Pereboom, Ted Sider, Adam Wager, and an anonymous referee for many helpful comments.
45 “Varieties

of Supervenience,” p. 238.
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“First, define a complete B-description of a world w as follows: if there are n members of
the domain of w, the description will begin with n existential quantifiers.

If variable x

corresponds to individual a, then the description will contain a conjunct Fx for each of a’s Bproperties F, and a conjunct ~Fx for each B-property that a lacks. [If variable y corresponds to
individual c, then the description will contain a conjunct Rxy for each two-place B-relation R that
a bears to c, and a conjunct ~Rxy for each two-place B-relation that a doesn’t bear to c.
Similarly for relations that are three-placed and greater.] The description will also include
conjuncts x ≠ y for each pair of distinct variables x and y that are bound by the existential
quantifiers, and a universal generalization saying that everything is one of the n things.
Obviously, any two worlds that have the same complete B-description will be B-indiscernible
with respect to a mapping of the domain of one onto the domain of the other [and any two worlds
that are B-indiscernible with respect to a mapping of the domain of one onto the domain of the
other will have the same complete B-description].
“Now suppose that A globally supervenes on B. Let w and z be any two possible worlds,
and a and b any two individuals from the domains of w and z, respectively, such that a has all the
same B’-properties in w that b has in z. Let

be the complete B-description of w, and let x be

the variable in the description that corresponds to a. Drop from

the quantifier that binds x, and

the result is an open sentence with one free variable that expresses the maximal B’ property that
a has in w. Since b has the same B’-properties in z as a has in w, it follows that b has this
property in z. But then the existential generalization of this open sentence, which is equivalent to
, is true in z, and so w and z are B-indiscernible, relative to a mapping that maps a to b. So
since we are assuming that A globally supervenes on B, it follows that w and z are also Aindiscernible, relative to the same mapping. [It follows from this that w and z will have the same
complete A-description and, moreover, if we drop the variable in that description that
corresponds to b giving us an open sentence with one free variable expressing the maximal A’
property that b has in z, a must also have that property in w. Therefore, A’] strongly supervenes
on B’.”
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